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THE WORK MADE FOR HIRE EXCEPTION TO THE VISUAL
ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990 (VARA): CARTER v.
HELMSLEY-SPEAR, INC.
When an artist creates, be he an author, a painter, a sculp-
tor, an architect or a musician, he does more than bring
into the world a unique object having only exploitive pos-
sibilities; he projects into the world part of his personality
and subjects it to the ravages of public use. There are pos-
sibilities of injury to the creator other than merely eco-
nomic ones; these the copyright statute does not protect.'
The creativity of a society is evidenced by the artistic expression
of its citizens. 2 Countries, therefore, must create a climate where
artists are encouraged by laws which protect the basic freedom of
artistic creation.3 In the United States, the duty to create such a
climate is placed squarely upon the shoulders of the United States
Congress, which has the power to promote the arts.
4
Congress heeded this call when it enacted the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).5 Under VARA, artists may prevent cer-
1. Martin A. Roeder, Note, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARv. L. Rzv. 554, 557 (1940).
2. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied
116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996). "A country is not truly civilized 'where the arts, such as
they have, are all imported, having no indigenous life.'" Id. (quoting 7 Works of
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Society and Solitude, Chapt. II Civilization 34 (AMS. Ed.
1968)).
3. See Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976). In
Gilliam, the court held that copyright laws should protect artists and encourage
production of artistic works because of the important role of artists in our society.
See id. Artists serve a special societal need by capturing the essence of our culture
and saving it for future generations. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 6 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6916 ("It is often through art that we are able to
see truths, both beautiful and ugly.").
4. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have Power... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries." Id. Although this clause concerns copyright ownership, the Framers in-
tended to grant rights to authors as an incentive for creation. See 1 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAcTICE 24 (1994). James Madison wrote in his Feder-
alist Papers that such encouragement was in the public's interest. See id. at 23-24.
Encouraging individuals through personal gain best advances the public welfare.
See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, LEGAL RiGHTS OF THE ARTIST ch.7, p. 1 (1971) (citing Ma-
zer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
5. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-33 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
(417)
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tain "distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of their works.6
As this Note illustrates, however, there are sweeping exceptions
under VARA that often swallow the intended protections of the Act.
One major exception under VARA, and the focus of this Note, is
the Act's "work made for hire" exception. 7 Under VARA's work
made for hire exception, artwork created by an employee within
the scope of employment is denied VARA protection.
In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit analyzed VARA's work made for hire exception.8 In
Carter, the property manager of a New York building attempted to
dismantle artwork constructed in the building's lobby. The artists
of the work moved for an injunction, alleging that such action con-
stituted a mutilation of their work under VARA. 9 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals never reached the question of whether this
type of removal constitutes a mutilation and thus infringes on art-
ists' rights under VARA. 10 Instead, the court concluded that the
relevant artwork was work made for hire and was therefore not cov-
ered under the Act.1 '
This Note analyzes the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' hold-
ing in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. and its interpretation of VARA's
work made for hire exception. First, this Note presents the back-
ground of VARA and its roots in a theory known as "moral rights."
Next, this Note describes the underlying facts and the procedural
history of the Carter case. Third, this Note analyzes the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Carter and concludes that its
holding unjustifiably limits artists' protection under VARA by misin-
terpreting the work made for hire exception of the Act. Finally,
this Note predicts that the Carter holding will deny artists the pro-
tections that Congress intended to provide under VARA.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996). For a full discussion of VARA, see infra notes 46-
63 and accompanying text.
7. For a full discussion of VARA's work made for hire exception, see infra
notes 64-94 and accompanying text.
8. 71 F.3d at 85.
9. See id. at 80. For a full discussion of the facts and procedural history of this
case, see infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
10. See Carter, 71 F.3d at 88. The Second Circuit held that the sculpture in
Carter was a "work made for hire" and therefore was not protected by VARA. Id.
For a discussion of the court's analysis of the "work made for hire" exception of
VARA, see infra notes 138-65 and accompanying text.
11. See Carter, 71 F.3d at 85-87. For a comprehensive look at the court's rea-
soning, see infra notes 115-62 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4: p. 417
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I. BACKGROUND
Throughout the world, artists' works are protected under a
theory known as "moral rights."12 Under the moral rights theory,
artists have certain inherent rights in their creations, independent
of any economic rights.13 For example, under the moral rights the-
ory, an artist who paints a portrait may prohibit others from alter-
ing that painting, even if the artist no longer owns the copyright to
the work.14 The United States Congress adopted this concept of
moral rights when it passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA). 15 Under VARA, Congress recognized the two most essen-
12. See RALPH E. LERNER &JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAw: THE GUIDE FOR COLLEC-
TORS, INVESTORS, DEALERs, AND ARTISTS 417 (1989). Moral rights are rights which
are personal rights of creators that exist independently of economic rights in a
creation. See id. The countries that have adopted such "moral rights" into law
include the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and most European and Latin
American countries. See id.
13. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 8D.01-8D.10 (1996).
The whole concept of moral rights is based on this element of separation from the
economic aspects of copyright. See id. at § 8D-1 n.2.
14. See Roeder, supra note 1, at 554. In a famous German case, a man
purchased a mural that was painted by a recognized artist and bore that artist's
name. See id. The purchaser, who was opposed to some nude figures that were
included in the mural, hired another artist to paint clothes on the nude figures.
See id. The German Supreme Court ruled that this type of alteration was prohib-
ited, even though the purchaser had economic rights to the work. See id.
15. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-33 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act of 1990 states as follows:
17 U.S.C. § 106A. Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity
(a) Rights of attribution and integrity.-Subject to section 107 and
independent of the exclusive rights provided in section 106, the au-
thor of a work of visual art-
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of
any work of visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall
have the right-
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of that work which would be prejudicial
to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional dis-
tortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a viola-
tion of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stat-
ure, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of
that work is a violation of that right.
(b) Scope and exercise of rights.-Only the author of a work of vis-
ual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work,
19971
3
Mastroianni: Work Made for Hire Exception to the Visual Artists Rights Act of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
420 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
tial moral rights: (1) the right of attribution, 16 which is the artist's
right to claim authorship in his or her work; and (2) the right of
integrity, 17 which is the right of an artist to prevent the modifica-
whether or not the author is the copyright owner. The authors of a
joint work of visual art are coowners of the rights conferred by sub-
section (a) in that work.
(c) Exceptions .... (3) The fights described in paragraphs (1) and
(2) of subsection (a) shall not apply to any reproduction, depiction,
portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any connection with
any item described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of the definition of
"work of visual art" in section 101, and any such reproduction, depic-
tion, portrayal, or other use of a work is not a destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification described in paragraph (3) of sub-
section (a).
17 U.S.C. § 113. Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works
(d)(1) In a case in which-
(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a
building in such a way that removing the work from the building will
cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
the work as described in section 106A(a) (3), and
(B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the build-
ing either before the effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or in a written instrument executed
on or after such effective date that is signed by the owner of the build-
ing and the author and that specifies that installation of the work may
subject the work to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modi-
fication, by reason of its removal,
then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a)
shall not apply.
17 U.S.C. §§ 106A, 113(d) (1) (1994). For a further discussion of the rights con-
ferred by VARA, see generally 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
1018 (1994); NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 8D.06; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the
101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM. VLAJ.L. & ARTS 447 (1991); EdwardJ.
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights
Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 945 (1990); Matthew A. Goodin, Note,
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Further Defining the Rights and Duties of Artists and
Real Property Owners, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567 (1992).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). The right of attribution under VARA in-
cludes the right to claim authorship of a work and also to prevent the use of the
author's name with works that are either not created by the author, or were cre-
ated by the author but subsequently altered. See id. Other aspects of the attribu-
tion right that are recognized in some European countries are the right to prevent
others from being named the author of a work, the right to publish a work anony-
mously, as well as the right to later claim authorship, and the right to prevent
others from using the work or the author's name in a way which is adverse to the
artist's professional standing. See NIMMER, supra note 13, at 8D-5. For the relevant
text of the VARA, see supra note 15.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. The right of integrity is the right of artists "to pre-
vent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of their works
that is prejudicial to their reputation. Id. There was debate over whether the out-
right destruction of a work violates an authors right of integrity. See LERNER &
BRESLER, supra note 12, at 421. Congress, however, under VARA, adopted the right
of integrity in outright destruction situations when dealing with a work of "recog-
nized stature." See PATRY, supra note 4, at 1044. Although Congress did not define
[Vol. 4: p. 417
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/8
VisuAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT
tion of his or her artwork. As this note illustrates, however, there
are broad exceptions to VARA.
The concept of moral rights is still at a relatively early stage in
its legal development.18 This section first summarizes the origins of
moral rights and their early history in the United States. Second,
this section describes the adoption of federal moral rights legisla-
tion by the United States under VARA. Finally, this section analyzes
the work made for hire exception under VARA, which is the princi-
pal issue in Carter.
A. The Origins of Moral Rights
The idea that artists have separate personal rights is rooted in
early French case law which recognized that, in the process of artis-
tic creation, the artist not only creates a work, but also injects his or
her spirit into that work.19 The French labeled these personal
rights "le droit morale,"20 from which comes the English translation
"moral rights." 21 The cornerstone of the concept of moral rights is
"recognized stature," the legislative history states that courts should take into ac-
count the opinions of the artistic community when determining whether a work is
of "recognized stature." See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 11, 15 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921. "The Courts should use common sense and gener-
ally accepted standards of the artistic community in determining whether a partic-
ular work falls within the scope of the definition." Id. For the relevant text of
VARA, see supra note 15.
18. SeeJohn Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1023, 1026 (1976). The doctrine of moral rights is still young even in France,
the country of its origin, and "has not reached anything like its full development."
Id.
19. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 12, at 417. The artist's integrity must be
preserved because of the injection of his or her personality into the work of art. See
id. This preservation of the artist's personality sprung out of the individualist phi-
losophies of the French Revolution. See id. As early as the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, French case law protected the mutilation of artistic works. See
Roeder, supra note 1, at 555. For a discussion of the common law emergence of le
droit morale in France, see generally Merryman, supra note 18.
20. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.01 [A], at 8D-4. The term le droit morale,
although in the singular form, actually describes a group of several different rights.
See id. The rights included are: the right of disclosure (allowing artists to deter-
mine when and how to make work public); the right to withdraw from publication
or to make modifications (allowing artists to modify work even if exploitation
rights are transferred); the right of authorship (allowing artists to be recognized as
author, prevent others from claiming authorship, and prevent use of artist's name
on works not created by author); and the right of integrity (allowing artist to pre-
vent tampering with work). See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 12, at 418-21.
21. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.01 [A], at 8D-4. The term moral rights, as
translated in English, most accurately can be described as "spiritual" and "non-
economic" rights. See id. The term moral rights often may cause confusion as to its
actual meaning. See PATRY, supra note 15, at 1021 n.9. The legislative history indi-
cates that such confusion existed even in the opinions of the Representatives. See
id. When the House of Representatives passed its version of VARA, a controversy
1997]
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that these rights are personal in nature and independent of any
pecuniary interests. 22 They allow artists to transfer the copyright in
a work of art while retaining inherent personal rights in that
work.23 Under French law, the concept of moral rights affords art-
ists broad protection and provides rights that are perpetual, inalien-
able and absolute.24
Several countries universally recognized artists' moral rights
under the Berne Convention of 1886, an international treaty for
the protection of literary and artistic works.25 The Berne Conven-
tion states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which shall
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 26
existed regarding graphic sexual photographs that the federally funded Corcoran
Gallery displayed to the public. See id. Senator Jesse Helms distributed copies of
the photographs to members of Congress and the photographer considered suing
Senator Helms for copyright infringement. See id. A Representative from Mon-
tana, who was not a sponsor of the House version of VARA, stated that if VARA was
in effect this controversy could have been avoided. Id. Such erroneous opinions
stem from the term "moral." See id.
22. See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1025. Copyright is an economic right
rather than a personal one. See id. The rights of personality include the right of
one's identity, name, reputation, profession or occupation, one's person, and to
privacy. See id.
23. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.01 [A], at 8D-4.
24. See id. § 8D.01 [A], at 8D-6. In France, a play which was written centuries
ago may still be protected from alterations. See id. As a result of French law being
considerably more broad than other countries such as the United States, artists
who cannot bring claims in the United States, may bring the same claim in France.
See id. § 8D.02[D], at 8D-21.
25. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
September 9, 1886, art. 6bis, 827 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "Berne Convention"].
This convention was held in Berne, Switzerland, for the purpose of protecting liter-
ary and artistic works throughout the world. See EDMUND JAN OSMANcZYK, THE EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 96 (1990).
The treaty was signed in Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886, and subse-
quently revised: Paris, 1896; Berlin, 1908; Berne, 1914; Rome, 1941; Brussels, 1948;
and Stockholm, 1967. See id. In 1988, at which time the United States became a
member nation of the Berne Convention, there were 76 member nations. See LER-
NER & BRESLER, supra note 12, at 417.
26. Berne Convention, supra note 25, at art. 6bis. Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention further provides:
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preced-
ing paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the ex-
piry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection
is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of
[Vol. 4: p. 417
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The Berne Convention established a minimum level of moral rights
for artists in participating countries. 27 To comply with the Berne
minimum, member nations need not adopt the broad moral rights
protections that countries such as France have embraced. 28
The United States was slow to adopt moral rights protection
for artists. Early case law, while recognizing the existence of moral
rights in foreign countries, refused to adopt the concept into U.S.
law.29 In Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, a church congregation
painted over a mural created by a well-known New York artist.30
their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the pro-
tection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preced-
ing paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death,
cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this
Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protec-
tion is claimed.
Id.
27. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.01 [B], at 8D-8. The Berne Convention
allows member countries to provide greater protection for artists and thus serves as
a minimum level of protection for member countries. See id. The Berne Conven-
tion does not provide for an initial dissemination and a retraction right, rights that
are provided for in various countries. See id. The initial dissemination right gives
the author the exclusive right to decide when to divulge his or her work. See id.
§ 8D.05 [A], at 8D-58. The right of retraction allows an author to recant an earlier
work. See id.
28. See id. § 8D.01 [B], at 8D-8. Berne specifies that the means of redress for
safeguarding rights under article 6bis, "shall be governed by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed." Id. This gives member nations great leeway
in the implementation of moral rights. See id. The United States has relied on this
language to support its broad exceptions to moral rights protection. See id. §
8D.02[D] [1], at 8D-21.
29. See Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 575 (N.Y. 1949);
Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947). In Vargas, the court
stated:
The conception of "moral rights" of authors so fully recognized and de-
veloped in the civil law countries has not yet received acceptance in the
law of the United States. No such right is referred to by legislation, court
decision or writers. What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law of
this country to conform to that of certain other countries. We need not
stop to inquire whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the
legislative or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not
disposed to make any new law in this respect.
Vargas, 164--F.2d at 526 (quoting STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 575).
30. Crimi, 194 Misc. at 571. Alfred Crimi, a well known New York artist, con-
tracted with Rutgers Presbyterian Church to paint a mural on the church's prop-
erty. See id. Some of the parishioners objected to the mural because Christ was
portrayed with much of his chest unclothed. See id. The congregation's displea-
sure of the representation of Christ led to the decision to paint over the mural. See
id. The nature of the mural was that which the paint was soaked into the wall,
therefore when the obstructing paint was removed, the mural would still be intact.
See id. The church painted over the mural and Crimi brought an action to force
the removal of the paint obstructing his art work. See id.
1997]
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The artist brought an action to remove the obstructing paint under
the theory that the destruction of the mural violated the artist's
moral right in his work.31 The Supreme Court of New York held
that moral rights, although well established in some countries, did
not exist under American law.3 2
In the United States, however, artists found protection under
existing legal theories such as copyright infringement, unfair com-
petition, defamation, and breach of contract.33 In Gilliam v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co.,34 a group of English writers, the creators of the
well known Monty Python comedy series, sought to enjoin the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) from televising their work
in an edited form.35 The Second Circuit held that the edited ver-
sion of the artists' work violated the Lanham Act, which prohibits
unfair competition, because it was a misrepresentation that injured
the artists' reputation.3 6 The court noted that it was actually recog-
31. See id. at 573. Aside from the moral rights claim, the artist alleged that
the destruction of the mural (1) constituted a breach of custom and usage that was
part of the contract, (2) violated the artist's continued proprietary interest in the
work, (3) constituted irreparable damage to the plaintiff, and (4) constituted an
anti-social act and was contrary to social policy. See id. at 572. The church argued
that when an artist transfers the copyright of a work and receives payment for that
work, the artist does not reserve any rights in that work. See id.
32. See id. at 576. The court stated:
The time for the artist to have reserved any rights was when he and his
attorney participated in the drawing of the contract with the church. No
rights in the fresco mural were reserved, and, by the terms of the written
agreement... the artist plaintiff sold and transferred to defendant all his
right, title and interest in the mural.
Id.
33. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.02 [A], at 8D-1 0. See also Gilliam v. Ameri-
can Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying moral rights under
principles of unfair competition); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 587 (2d Cir. 1952)
(protecting misrepresentation of artist's work under breach of contract theory);
Prouty v. National Broad. Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 265 (D. Mass. 1939) (protecting
misrepresentation of artists' work under tort of unfair competition).
34. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
35. Id. at 18. The work in question was three episodes totaling a combined 90
minutes, of which the defendant had cut 24 minutes for commercial time. See id.
The court agreed that this misrepresentation of the plaintiffs' work was injurious
to their professional reputation. See id. at 19.
36. See id. at 24. The Lanham Act states in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services,... a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation ... and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil action by any person . . . who
believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false
description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The Gilliam court noted that the Lanham Act was
invoked to prevent misrepresentations that may injure a person's business or repu-
tation even where no registered trademark is concerned. GiUiam, 538 F.2d at 24.
[Vol. 4: p. 417
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nizing the concept of moral rights under the existing legal theory
of unfair competition.3 7  Many American artists similarly sought
protection under this and other existing legal theories.38 In addi-
tion, the growing plight of artists prompted state legislatures to en-
act specific moral rights legislation.3 9
On the federal level, Congress was slow to enact moral rights
protection for artists. The United States did not join the Berne
Convention as a signatory nation until over 100 years after the origi-
nal convention. 40 This delay largely resulted from opposition by
the motion picture and television industries which feared that
moral rights would impede their ability to distribute works.41 In
37. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24. In reaching its decision, the Gilliam court ex-
pressly stated that it was actually recognizing the concept of moral rights, albeit
under the umbrella of unfair competition. See id.
American Copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral
rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks
to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.
Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation
that serves as the foundation for American copyright law, cannot be rec-
onciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or mis-
representation of their work to the public on which the artists are
financially dependant.
Id.
38. See PATRY, supra note 4, at 427-28 (discussing alternate legal theories used
to protect artists).
39. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 12, at 430-35. Several states enacted
moral rights legislation protecting the personality of artists. See, e.g. California Art
Preservation Act, CAL. Civ. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1988); New York Artists' Au-
thorship Rights Act, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AIr. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1988); Louisi-
ana Artists' Authorship Rights Act, 1986 LA. Acrs 599, ch. 32; New Mexico Act
Relating to Fine Art in Public Buildings, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-1 (Michie 1989);
Maine Moral Rights Statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West Supp. 1987);
Massachusetts Moral Rights Statute, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 85S; ch. 260 § 2c
(Law. Co-op. 1984); Pennsylvania Fine Arts Preservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§§ 2101, 2121 (West 1987); Rhode Island Artists' Rights Act, 1987 R.I. PUB. LAWS
566; Utah Percent-for-Art Statute, Moral Rights Provision, UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-
2a-9 (1985).
States enacted moral rights legislation in response to several notable instances
in which artists were left with no relief. See Lerner & Bresler, supra note 12, at 428.
For example, in 1975, a New York bank commissioned a renowned Japanese artist
to create a sculpture for its headquarters. See id. The sculpture was suspended
from the ceiling in the lobby. See id. Five years later, the bank removed the sculp-
ture, without notifying the artist, and dismantled it for storage. See id. The artist
found no relief because he had transferred his rights in the sculpture to the bank.
See id. Several members of the art community were enraged by similar instances,
therefore States enacted legislation to protect artists and their works. See id. at 428-
35.
40. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.02[C], at 8D-13.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 7-8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6917-20. Proprietary groups argued that moral rights would substantially
change the American copyright system. See id. Congress faced heavy opposition by
various "user groups" such as the motion picture and television industries over the
1997]
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1988, Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act
(BCIA), but this act did not adopt the moral rights portion of the
Berne Convention. 42 Under the BCIA, Congress found that the ex-
isting American laws provided artists with sufficient protection to
meet the minimum moral rights requirement of the Berne Conven-
tion. 43 Congress, therefore, refused to alter existing laws regarding
artists' moral rights. 4 4 Congress did conclude, however, that fed-
eral moral rights legislation, although unnecessary for Berne com-
pliance, should be adopted under a separate bill.45
entry of the United States to the Berne Convention. See Merryman, supra note 18,
at 1026 .n.9. The concerns stem from the fact that artists' right of integrity may
conflict with the distribution and marketing of these groups. See H.R. REP. No.
101-514, at 7-10. The motion picture and television industries' vocal objections
also hindered the passage of moral rights to other groups, such as visual artists,
because these art forms were all considered together. See Merryman, supra note 18
at 1026 n.9.
42. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (BCIA), Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). On October 31, 1988, President Reagan signed
BCIA into law. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 12, at 417. Due to the heavy
opposition of the motion picture and television industries, however, Congress took
the moral rights provision out of the bill. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.02 [C], at
8D-15.
43. SeeNMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.02[D] [1], at 8D-16, 17. Congress was able
to pass the BCIA and at the same time not recognize its moral rights provision
because Congress found that the existing laws of the United States were adequate
to satisfy the Berne minimum requirement. See id. There were opposing views at
the time as to whether the United States' existing laws were sufficient for Berne
adherence. See id. Some believed that existing laws did not adequately separate
pecuniary and moral rights so as to be consistent with the spirit of the Berne Con-
vention. See id. at 8D-21. Others believed that moral rights were narrowly recog-
nized already in the United States and took refuge in the fact that the Berne
Convention allowed member nations to safeguard the stated rights under each
nation's own legislation. See id. For a discussion on the existing moral rights of
this time, see supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
44. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.02[D], at 8D-16. The text of BCIA ex-
pressly says it does not expand or reduce any rights of an author to assert the rights
of attribution and integrity. See id. The legislative history of the BCIA states that
the existing U.S. laws adequately protect artists' rights to claim authorship and to
object to distortions of their works. See S. REP. No. 100-352, at 9-10 (1988).
This existing U.S. law includes various provisions of the Copyright Act
and Lanham Act, various state statutes, and common law principles such
as libel, defamation, misrepresentation, and unfair competition, which
have been applied by courts to redress authors' invocation of the right to
claim authorship or the right to object to distortion.
Id.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8. The BCIA left the question of moral
rights legislation open for future development. See id. at 10. The Subcommittee
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice continued to
hold hearings on the need for federal moral rights legislation. See id. at 8.
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B. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
The United States Congress enacted federal moral rights legis-
lation under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).46 The
principal goal of VARA is to protect the personality of the artist by
preserving original works of art.47 VARA's legislative history states:
" [T] he paramount goal of the legislation: [is] to preserve and pro-
tect certain categories of original works of art. '4 8 By preserving
original works of art, Congress intended to create an atmosphere
encouraging artistic creation.49 Furthermore, Congress intended
to replace a patchwork of laws, including various legal theories and
state statutes, with a single set of rules protecting visual art.50
46. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-33 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The bill
was signed on December 1, 1990 by President Bush. See PATRY, supra note 15, at
1018 n.1. It was first introduced in 1979 and was reintroduced several times before
its final version in 1989. See id. The bill's earlier versions were broader in scope
and included a provision on artists' resale royalties, droit de suite. See id. The final
bill protected only "visual artists" and became effective June 1, 1991. See id. For
the relevant text of VARA, see supra note 15.
47. See PATRY, supra note 15, at 1032-34. By protecting the original forms of
an artwork, Congress ensured that "the culture is passed on to future generations
intact." Id. at 1032.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 17-18 (1990), repfrinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6927-28.
49. See id. at 5-10. The purpose of VARA is to protect artists and their work in
order to enhance the culture of our nation. See id. at 5. "The theory of moral
rights is that they result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages
the author in the arduous act of creation." Id. (statement of Honorable Ralph
Oman, Register of Copyrights). Artists capture our culture and inscribe it into the
analogues of history. See id. "It is often through art that we are able to see truths,
both beautiful and ugly." Id.
One commentator noted that there were three reasons for adopting moral
rights legislation in the United States: (1) to gain international credibility, (2)
moral rights reaches the physical object which does not disrupt producers and
publishers, (3) limited adoption of moral rights allows a chance to experiment
with its success. See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 478-80.
50. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 9-10. The legislative history of VARA reveals
Congress' intent to create a unified system of federal moral rights. See id. "John
Koegel, a practitioner who has represented various artistic interests, noted at the
Subcommittee's hearings that [state laws] are a 'patchwork of rules which by itself
vitiates somewhat the single, unified system of copyright. Artists, lawyers, courts,
and even the owners of works deserve a single set of rules on this subject.'" Id.
(quoting The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989; Hearings on H.. 2690 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., (1989) (statement of Prof. John B.
Koegel, at 6)).
VARA preempts any state law that similarly protects the rights of attribution
and integrity in works of "visual art." See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.06[F], at 8D-
90. VARA does not preempt state laws that protect works that do not fall within
VARA's protected class of "works of visual art." See id.
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VARA grants rights that are analogous to those under the
Berne Convention. 51 Most importantly, the Act provides for certain
authors the rights of attribution and integrity.52 The right of attri-
bution is a right that allows an artist to claim authorship of his or
her visual artworks. 53 The right of integrity, on the other hand, is a
right that prevents the distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of visual artwork.5 4 Unlike the moral rights legislation of other sig-
natory nations of the Berne Convention, the above rights granted
under VARA are not perpetual, but rather endure only during the
life of the author.55
VARA further differs from its foreign counterparts in that it
protects only a narrow category of works of "visual art."56 The Act's
51. See H.R. RFP. No. 101-514, at 5. The legislative history of VARA states that
the rights created are "analogous to those protected under Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention, which are commonly known as 'moral rights.'" Id.
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. For the relevant text of VARA, see supra note 9.
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. The right of attribution under VARA has three com-
ponents. See PARRY, supra note 15, at 1037. First, there is the artist's right to claim
authorship of a work of visual art which he or she has created. See id. at 1038.
Second, the author has the right to prevent the association of his or her name as to
works that the artist did not create. See id. Third, the author may prevent the use
of his or her name as to works created by the author, but which have been dis-
torted, mutilated, or modified in a way that is injurious to the author's reputation.
See id. For the relevant text of VARA, see supra note 15.
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. There are two components to the right of integrity
under VARA. See PATRY, supra note 15, at 1038. First, the violation of the right
must be intentional, and second, the distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of the work must be prejudicial to the honor or reputation of the artist. See id.
Some Beme members do not protect artists against the complete destruction of
their works because, theoretically, there is no effect on the artist's reputation since
the work no longer exists. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6926. VARA, however, protects artists against such destruction.
See id. "This model recognizes that destruction of works of art has a detrimental
effect on the artist's reputation, and that it also represents a loss to society." Id.
(statement of Honorable Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
The right of integrity, however, is limited when certain visual art works are
incorporated into buildings. See 17 U.S.C. § 113. There has been great debate in
various countries over the conflicting interests of property owners and artists when
art is incorporated into buildings. See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1047. For the
relevant text of VARA, see supra note 15.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). "With respect to works of visual art created on or
after the effective date ... of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, the rights con-
ferred by subsection (a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the au-
thor." Id. This limitation on the duration of moral rights protection may be
contrary to the Berne Convention's requirement that the fights of integrity and
attribution "be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights." See
Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 484-85 (citing Berne Convention, art. 6bis).
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
A "work of visual art" is-
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
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definition of a "work of visual art" critically limits the scope of
moral rights under VARA.5 7 The definition "encompasses certain
paintings, drawings, prints, sculpture, and finally, still photographic
images produced for exhibition purposes only. In all cases, these
works are covered only in single copies or in limited editions of 200
or fewer copies."5 8 Furthermore, the definition of a "work of visual
art" specifically excludes certain listed items. 59 By narrowly defin-
ing works of "visual art," Congress intended to limit protection only
to original artwork and not to works of mass production or publica-
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying
mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edi-
tion of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered
by the author.
Id.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 10-11. In Senate hearings prior to VARA's
passage, Representative Edward J. Markey reiterated:
"I would like to stress that we have gone to extreme lengths to very nar-
rowly define the works of art that will be covered. While we are sensitive
to the concerns of those industries that wish to maintain their rights of
editing and reproduction, I must take this opportunity to emphasize that
this legislation covers only a very select group of artists whose works have
been allowed to fall through the existing gaps in our copyright law."
A Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code, to Provide Certain Rights of Attribution and
Integrity to Authors of Works of Visual Art: Hearings on S. 1198 Before the Subcomm. On
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate,
101st Cong. 694 (1989) [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"]. This narrow category of
coverage for only works of "visual art" may be at odds with the moral rights granted
in other Berne States, where moral rights apply across almost all categories of copy-
righted works. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8D.02[D] [1], at 8D-20.
58. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8-10. The legislative history of VARA dictates
that courts use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic
community to determine whether or not a particular work falls within the defini-
tion of a "work of visual art." See id.
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
A work of visual art does not include-
(A) (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, elec-
tronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, cov-
ering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title ....
Id. "Applied art" refers to artistic items which are affixed to otherwise utilitarian
objects. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. [hereinafter "Carter I"], 861 F. Supp.
303, 315 (1994). "Applied art" does not, however, refer to all items which are
merely incorporated into useful articles. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tion. 60 Congress imposed these limitations on the scope of VARA
after the motion picture, television, and publications industries
voiced concerns that expansive moral rights would impair the distri-
bution and marketing of copyrighted material.6 1 Under VARA,
Congress intended to protect visual artists, such as painters and
sculptors, without inhibiting the economic interests of these indus-
tries.62 To clarify these limitations on the scope of VARA, the Act
specifically excludes from coverage certain listed works, works
60. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8-10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6918-20. Congress distinguished visual art from works of mass production in
the legislative history of the Act. See id. The legislative history of VARA states:
[W] orks of Visual Art covered by [VARA] are limited to originals: works
created in single copies or in limited editions. They are generally not
physically transformed to suit the purposes of different markets. Further,
when an original of a work of visual art is modified or destroyed, it cannot
be replaced. This is not the case when one copy of a work produced in
potentially unlimited copies is altered.
Id. at 9.
61. See SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 57, at 694. In congressional hearings
prior to VARA's passage and scope, Congress heard members of the publication
and production industries testify extensively as to the harmful effects of moral
rights upon their industries. See id. Peter Nolan, vice-president - counsel of Walt
Disney Company, testified against the application of moral rights to the motion
picture industry. See id. at 1038. Specifically, Mr. Nolan addressed the effect that
moral rights would have on the distribution of video because of the method used
to prepare movies for video, a process known as "panning and scanning." See id. at
1045. See also id. at 1065 (testimony ofJ. Nichols Counter III, president, Alliance of
Motion Picture and Television Producers).
Victor Kovner, chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee of Magazine publish-
ers of America, also argued against moral rights in the publication industry. See id.
at 641. Mr. Kovner stated "[o]ur members are in the business of disseminating
information to the reading public in a timely manner. The record of the Berne
debate is replete with examples given to you and your colleagues by our members
and by others of the impediments to accomplishment of this objective which would
be created by a federal 'moral rights' regime." Id. at 646-47. These impediments
include curtailing editors' freedoms of judgement and customs of cutting and ad-
ding language. See id. at 647. See also id. at 678 (statement of R. Jack Fishman,
publisher, Lakeway Publishers, representing the National Newspaper Association).
The legislative history of VARA uses the audiovisual industry to illustrate the
distinction which Congress drew between works of visual art and works of mass
publication. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8-9 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917-20.
[A]udiovisual works are generally works-made-for-hire. Granting
these artists the rights of attribution and integrity might conflict with the
distribution and marketing of these works.
Motion pictures and other audiovisual works are generally produced
and exploited in multiple copies.... Each market has its own commercial
and technological configuration that affects how the work will appear
when presented. In contrast, the works of visual art covered by [VARA]
are limited to originals: works created in single copies or in limited
editions.
Id. at 9.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 10. "Because of its limited nature, [VARA]
protects the legitimate interests of visual artists without inhibiting the rights of
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made for hire, and works that are not subject to copyright
protection. 63
C. VARA's Work Made for Hire Exception
One major exception under VARA, and the topic of this Note,
is the "work made for hire" exception, which denies the protection
of works that fall within the statutory definition of "work made for
hire. ' 64 Since VARA was enacted as an addition to the Copyright
Act, it shares the same textual definition of work made for hire as
does the rest of the Copyright Act.6 5 The definition of work made
for hire is two-fold, including both employees within the scope of
their employment, and certain specified independent contrac-
tors.66 The independent contractor portion of the work made for
hire definition is clear, and simply lists those works that are in-
copyright owners and users, and without undue interference with the successful
operation of the American copyright system." Id.
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). For the relevant text of 17 U.S.C. § 101, see
supra note 59.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
A "work made for hire" is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instruc-
tional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the
forgoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for publi-
cation as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the pur-
pose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as fore-
words, afterwards, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial
notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, ap-
pendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial,
or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in
systematic instructional activities.
Id.
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
66. See id. The legislative history of the "work made for hire" doctrine indi-
cates that the limitation of commissioned works to specifically listed categories was
the result of a compromise between two competing interests: (1) authors, who
lacked the bargaining power to reject contracts which disclaimed authorship, and
(2) publishers and motion picture studios that were concerned that there would
be limitations placed on the exploitation of works traditionally done by independ-
ent contractors in their industries. SeeJessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 890-91 (1987). "The groups compro-
mised by limiting commissioned works for hire to the specific classes of works,
typically created by multiple authors, that publishers and motion picture studios
had cited in objecting to earlier proposals to limit works made for hire to works
created by employees." Id.
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cluded.67 These listed items share a similarity in that they are all
activities involving publication or production. 68 The employee por-
tion of the "work made for hire" definition is slightly more ambigu-
ous, however, because it fails to define the terms "employee" or
"within the scope of his or her employment."69 This begs the ques-
tion: who is an employee acting within the scope of his or her
employment?
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,70 the Supreme
Court, in an effort to ensure the predictability of copyright owner-
ship, defined the term "employee" under the work made for hire
doctrine. 71 In Reid, the Community for Creative Non-Violence
67. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738
(1989). If a commissioned work does not fit into the nine categories of specifically
commissioned works listed in the work made for hire definition, then it does not
qualify under 17 U.S.C. § 101. See id. In ruling that this list of works was exclusive,
the Supreme Court in Reid ended differences among the Circuit Courts on the
provision. See Anne Marie Hill, The "Work For Hire" Definition in the Copyright Act of
1976: Conflict Over Specially Ordered or Commissioned Works, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 559,
571-80. Prior to the Reid decision, there were two definitions of specially ordered
or commissioned works made for hire: (1) the "exclusive" test in which works had
to fit within one of the nine specified categories, and (2) the "non-exclusive" test
in which works outside of the nine specified categories could apply if performed
pursuant to the basic standards of agency law. See id. at 560. For a discussion of
Reid, see infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
68. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 741 n.7. See also Litman, supra note 66, at 890-91
(describing compromise between authors and publication industries that resulted
in inclusion of certain independent contractors within "work made for hire.").
69. See Litman, supra note 66, at 890-91. The lower federal courts were left to
devise their own tests to determine if an artist was an "employee" acting within the
scope of his or her employment. See PATRY, supra note 4, at 376. The courts of
appeals developed four tests: (1) the right to control the hired party; (2) actual
supervision and control over the hired party; (3) common law agency rules; and
(4) formal, salaried employment. See id. See also Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d
1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (adopting formal salaried employee test); Brunswick
Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publ'g Co., 810 F.2d 410, 415 (4th Cir. 1987)
(adopting actual supervision and control test over creation of work test); Easter
Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-
37 (5th Cir. 1987) (adopting common law agency meaning); Evans Newton, Inc. v.
Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 1986) (adopting actual supervi-
sion and control test over creation of work test); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Speigel,
Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 555 (2d Cir. 1984) (adopting actual supervision and control test
over creation of work test); Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.
Colo. 1985) (adopting right to control hired party test); Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566
F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
70. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
71. See id. at 750. In Reid, the Supreme Court created a test that is consistent
with Congress' goal to "enhance predictability and certainty of copyright owner-
ship." Id. at 749 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976)). The Supreme
Court stated, "[i]n a 'copyright marketplace,' the parties negotiate with an expec-
tation that one of them will own the copyright in the completed work." Id. (citing
Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Court
noted that parties can settle on other relevant contractual terms, such as price,
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(CCNV), an organization dedicated to eliminating homelessness,
entered an oral agreement with James Earl Reid, a sculptor, to cre-
ate a statue depicting the homeless. 72 CCNV commissioned this
work specifically for display at a fund-raising Christmas pageant.
73
The parties, however, never discussed the copyright ownership of
the work, and after the pageant, both CCNV and Reid filed compet-
ing copyright certificates.74 CCNV argued that the sculpture was a
work made for hire under the Copyright Act of 1976, thus making
them the owners of the statue. 75
The Supreme Court in Reid held that the statue at issue was not
a work made for hire because the sculptor, Mr. Reid, was not an
"employee" of CCNV. The Court defined the term "employee"
under the work for hire doctrine using common law principles of
agency.76 Under agency principles, there are several factors used to
determine whether an employee is acting within the scope of his or
her employment.77 Collectively, these factors have become known
with the expectation of copyright ownership. See id. at 750. The test set forth by
the Reid Court, therefore, allowed parties to ensure "predictability through ad-
vance planning." Id.
One commentator has noted that the Reid test actually brings great uncer-
tainty. SeeJohn Spadt, Note, Work Made For Higher Understanding of the Copyright Act
of 1976, 4 ViL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 191, 210 (1997). While some courts applying
the Reid test gave great weight to certain factors of the test, other courts gave rela-
tively little weight to the same factors. See id. Compare Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co.,
969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992) (giving substantial weight to ninth Reid factor, hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants), withAymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d
Cir. 1992) (giving no weight to ninth Reid factor).
72. Reid, 490 U.S. at 733.
73. See id. at 735.
74. See id. Under the work made for hire doctrine, CCNV contended that it
was the legal "author" of the sculpture. See id. at 737.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 740. The Court noted that Congress used the phrase "scope of
employment," which is a common term in agency law. See id. The Court reasoned
that alternative tests, adopted by the circuit courts, are contrary to both the lan-
guage and the legislative history of the work made for hire doctrine. See id. at 739-
51. For a discussion of the legislative history of the work made for hire doctrine,
see supra notes 60-62.
77. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. The thirteen factors which courts are to consider
in determining whether a person is an "employee" under the work for hire doc-
trine are (1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished, (2) the skill required, (3) the source of the instru-
mentalities and tools, (4) the location of the work, (5) the duration of the relation-
ship between the parties, (6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party, (7) the extent of the hired party's discretion
over when and how long to work, (8) the method of payment, (9) the hired party's
role in hiring and paying assistants, (10) whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party, (11) whether the hiring party is in business, (12) the
provision of employee benefits, and (13) the tax treatment of the hired party. See
id. at 751-52. See also Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989)
19971
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as the Reid test. In Reid, the Court listed these factors and stressed
that "[n]o one of these factors is determinative" of an employee
relationship. 78 After applying the Reid factors, the Court deter-
mined that Mr. Reid did not qualify as an employee. In support of
its holding, the Court noted that the definition of "work made for
hire" was the result of a carefully worked out compromise that bal-
anced the copyright ownership interests of creators and copyright-
using industries. 79
All subsequent cases that applied the Reid test did so to deter-
mine copyright ownership between the "employee" and the em-
ployer.80 Courts recognized that not all of the Reid factors are
(describing location of work, hiring party's right to assign additional projects, pro-
vision of benefits, and tax treatment of hired parties); Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB,
690 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing hiring party's right to control manner
and means of production, and regular business of hiring party); NLRB v. United
Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 259 (1968) (describing source of instrumentalities
and tools, duration of relationship between parties, and hired party's discretion
over when and how long to work); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)
(describing skill required to produce work, and hired party's role in hiring and
paying assistants).
78. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
79. See id. at 748. The work made for hire doctrine under the Copyright Act
of 1976 was the result of two decades of negotiations between creators and copy-
right-using industries. See id. at 743. The first proposed definition of "work made
for hire" simply included works created by employees within the scope of their
employment. See id. at 744-45. After objections from book publishers, a 1964 revi-
sion bill expanded the work made for hire definition to include commissioned
works that the parties agreed to in writing. See id. at 745. Authors, however, ob-
jected to this definition because they believed publishers would use superior bar-
gaining power to force authors into signing work made for hire agreements. See id.
at 74546. The parties compromised by including only a select group of commis-
sioned works that are ordinarily prepared at the risk of publishers and producers.
See id. at 746. See also Litman, supra note 66, at 888-93 (discussing compromise
between authors and publishers reached under work made for hire definition).
80. See, e.g., High-Tech Video Prods. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093,
1096 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying Reid test to determine copyright ownership of travel
video); Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.
1993) (applying Reid test to determine copyright ownership of computer software);
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (ap-
plying Reid test to determine copyright ownership of photographs taken for use in
catalogue); Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying Reid test
to determine copyright ownership of computer programming); Marco v. Accent
Publ'g Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1549 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v.
Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 775 (3d Cir. 1991) (same);
Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d
Cir. 1991) (applying Reid test to determine copyright ownership of series of street
maps); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1490 (lth
Cir. 1990) (applying Reid test to determine copyright ownership of floor plan
designed by house builder).
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relevant to every fact situation.8 ' In Aymes v. Bonelli,8 2 Clifford
Aymes, a computer programmer, brought an action for copyright
infringement against a swimming pool retailer after the retailer
claimed ownership of certain programs created by Aymes.8 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the Reid test and
determined that the computer programs were not works made for
hire, and therefore, were owned by Aymes. The court set forth five
Reid factors that are significant to nearly all factual situations: (1)
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of crea-
tion; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits;
(4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party.8 4
In Aymes, the court of appeals further explained that the weight of
each Reid factor should be determined by the facts of a given case.8 5
Thus, cases subsequent to Reid further developed the Reid test in
81. SeeAutoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1489
(10th Cir. 1993) (holding that some Reid factors were indeterminate); Aymes v.
Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding certain Reid factors to be more
significant than others); Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1549 (3d Cir.
1992) (holding that some Reid factors were indeterminate); MacLean Assoc., Inc.
v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc. 952 F.2d 769, 775 (3d Cir. 1991) (fail-
ing to address several Reid factors); Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber
of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that some Reid factors
were indeterminate); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco, 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that some Reid factors were indeterminate); M.G.B. Homes,
Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1990) (addressing only
eight Reid factors).
82. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. See id. at 859. Aymes' computer programs maintained the retailer's
records of cash receipts, physical inventory, sales figures, purchase orders, mer-
chandise transfers, and price changes. See id. The company asked Aymes to re-
lease his rights to the computer programs, which he refused to do. See id. After
Aymes registered the programs in his own name with the U.S. Copyright Office, he
filed a complaint against the retailer in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging copyright infringement under the Copy-
right Act of 1976. See id.
84. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. The court stated that "[t]hese factors will al-
most always be relevant and should be given more weight in the analysis, because
they will usually be highly probative of the true nature of the employment relation-
ship." Id. The Aymes court noted, as an example, that the authority to hire assist-
ants will not be relevant if the nature of the work requires the hired party to work
alone. Id. Conversely, if an independent contractor does hire and pay assistants,
this factor can be very indicative of the relationship between the parties. See id.
The Second Circuit noted that the trial court's factual findings "as to the pres-
ence or absence of the Reid factors cannot be disturbed unless clearly erroneous."
Id. The ultimate work made for hire determination, however, is reviewed de novo
because the overall weighing of the Reid factors is a question of law. See id.
85. Id. The Supreme Court in Reid did not explain how the factors it set forth
should be weighed. See id. However, courts should not merely tally up the amount
of factors that are present in a specific case. See id. Courts must weigh the Reid
factors based on each factor's significance in a given case. See id.
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the context of determining copyright ownership. The question re-
mains, however, if the Reid test and its subsequent developments
should be similarly applied in VARA situations, rather than copy-
right ownership situations.
In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear Inc.,8 6 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York was the first court to analyze the
"work made for hire" exception under VARA. The district court
noted that the "work made for hire" exception under VARA serves
the purpose of defining a "work of visual art" and not for the tradi-
tional purpose of determining copyright ownership.87 VARA's text
suggests that the work made for hire exception distinguishes origi-
nal works from reproductions.88 VARA's legislative history also in-
dicates that VARA's work made for hire exception reinforces
VARA's intent to protect original works of art as opposed to
reproductions.89
[The work made for hire exception is] self-explanatory
and reinforce[s] the premise of the bill: to cover only
those works described in the definition of a work of visual
art and therefore to protect only originals of those works
of art. [Work made for hire] distinguish[es] covered
works of visual art from other works that are denied pro-
tection, such as newspapers, audiovisual works, applied
art, and maps.90
86. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), modified, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). For
the facts of Carter, see infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
87. See id. at 321. In Carter, the artists owned the copyright to their work
under a written agreement, therefore, the court did not apply the Reid test for the
traditional purpose of determining copyright ownership. See id. at 322-23. The
district court noted the different purpose of the work made for hire exception
under VARA, as opposed to work made for hire under traditional copyright law.
See id. "Under VARA . . . the 'work made for hire' analysis is undertaken for a
different purpose: The hired party's employment status is analyzed to ascertain
whether a work created by that party may be considered a 'work of visual art.'" Id.
at 321.
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c) (3) (1994).
(3) The rights described in paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall
not apply to any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a
work in, upon, or in any connection with any item described in [the work
made for hire exception] . . . of "work of visual art" in section 101, and
any such reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work is not
a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification ....
Id.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915.
90. Id.
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Commentators have also offered various views on the purpose
of the work made for hire exception under VARA.91 One commen-
tator noted that granting moral rights to the authors of works made
for hire is anomalous to the concept of moral rights. 92 This is be-
cause under the work made for hire doctrine, employers are not
only considered the owners of works but also the "author.'" 93 Moral
rights, therefore, will vest in employers under VARA if works made
for hire are protected. This result is contrary to the concept of
moral rights, which protect the personality of the creator.94 One
thing that is clear, however, is that the underlying purpose of the
work made for hire exception may help courts establish who quali-
fies as an "employee" for VARA purposes and who is therefore ex-
cluded from protection. Against this background, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the case of Carter v. Helms-
ley-Spear, Inc.
91. One commentator stated that the "work made for hire" exception under
VARA has two purposes: "1) to reassure large exploiters, such as publishers of
periodicals, that they need not fear moral rights claims from artists creating works
for their publication; 2) to limit the law's coverage to objects of 'Art,' rather than
of mass production." See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 480.
92. See Damich, supra note 15, at 964-65. Granting moral rights to employers,
rather than the creator of the work, "would be truly anomalous from the stand-
point of moral rights theory, which seeks to protect the personality of the creator
of the work." Id.
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
(b) Works Made for Hire.- In the case of a work made for hire, the em-
ployer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.
Id. The United States is one of the only countries to grant not only ownership, but
also authorship to the employer for hire. See PATRY, supra note 4, at 374. It is
questionable whether this grant of authorship, rather than merely economic
rights, is constitutional. See id. at 374-75. "It has been doubted, whether Congress
has authority to decide the fact, that a person is an author or inventor in the sense
of the Constitution, so as to preclude that question from judicial inquiry." Id. at
375 n.60 (quoting J. STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1148
(1833)).
94. See PATRY, supra note 4, at 374-75. VARA avoids the anomalous result of
granting employers moral rights by categorically excluding works made for hire.
See id. This exclusion also denies moral rights to the creators of works made for
hire. See id. The Berne Convention, however, allows for this exclusion of works
made for hire because it does not define the term "author," but merely assumes
that the author is the creator. See id. Since the exclusion of works made for hire
contradicts the Berne Convention's intent to protect the personality of the creator,
courts should read this exclusion as narrowly as possible. See id.
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II. FACTS: CARTER V. HELMSLEY-SPEAR, INC.
John Carter, John Swing, and John Veronis [hereinafter "Art-
ists"] created art and sculpture work together in New York City.95
474431 Associates [hereinafter "Associates"] owned a commercial
building located at 47-44 31st Street, in Queens, New York.96 On
February 1, 1990, Associates leased this building to 47-44 31st Street
Associates, L.P. [hereinafter "Limited Partnership"] .97 From Febru-
ary 1, 1990 to June, 1993, SIG Management Company [hereinafter
"SIG"] managed the property for the Limited Partnership. 98
On December 16, 1991, the Artists contracted with SIG "to de-
sign, create and install sculpture and other permanent installa-
tions" in the lobby and other areas of the building.99 Under the
contract, the artists had "full authority in design, color, and style" of
the artwork they installed. 100 SIG, however, could direct the loca-
95. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. [hereinafter "Carter II"], 71 F.3d 77, 80
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996). Plaintiff John Meade Swing is a
sculptor and artist who has held public exhibitions of his works of art since 1984.
See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. [hereinafter "Carter I"], 861 F. Supp. 303, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), modified, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). Mr. Swing is a sculptural steel
welder and is licensed by the city of New York. See id. PlaintiffJohn James Veronis,
Jr., and plaintiff John Francis are also artists who support themselves through their
artistic works. See id. These three artists are partners in the business of creating
sculptures and other works of art. See id. They are collectively known as the
"Three-J's" or "Jx3." See id.
96. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80. Associates has owned this New York property
since 1978. See id. The General Partners of Associates are Alvin Schwartz and Su-
pervisory Management Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Helmsley Enter-
prises, Inc. See id. Defendant Helmsley-Spear, Inc. became the managing agent of
the property for Associates on April 6, 1994. See id. at 81.
97. See id. at 80. The lease was a 48-year net lease. See id. The Limited Part-
nership was a Delaware based limited partnership. See id. There was no relation-
ship other than lessor/lessee between Associates and the Limited Partnership. See
id. Irwin Cohen, or an entity controlled by him, was the general partner of this
Limited Partnership from February 1, 1990, untilIJune, 1993. See id. During this
time, Cohen managed the property through SIG Management Company. See
Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 312. Also during this period of time, Corporate Life Insur-
ance Company was a limited partner of the Limited Partnership. See id.
98. See CarterII, 71 F.3d at 80. Mr. Cohen, the general partner of the Limited
Partnership, controlled SIG Management Company and was personally responsi-
ble for managing the Property on behalf of SIG from February 1, 1990 until June,
1993. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 312.
99. See Carter 1, 71 F.3d at 86. This was a one year agreement and on January
20, 1993, SIG and the artists agreed to extend the existing contract for an addi-
tional year. See id.
100. See id. at 80. The Second Circuit found that the Artists had complete
freedom in every aspect of creation. See id. Although the Artists accepted sugges-
tions from the building's engineers, architects and others, they retained full artistic
freedom. See id. at 86.
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tion and installation of the artwork within the building.101 Under
the contract, SIG agreed to pay the Artists one thousand dollars a
week for at least forty hours of work. 10 2 While the Artists retained
copyright in their work, SIG was to receive one-half of any proceeds
collected from the exploitation of the art.103
The Artists installed a large walk-through sculpture that occu-
pied most of the building's lobby. 10 4 Several individual elements of
the sculpture consisted mostly of recycled metals. 10 5 The individual
elements of this work combined to create a theme relating to envi-
ronmental concerns and the importance of recycling.10 6
101. See id. at 80. This limitation, according to a preliminary injunction hear-
ing, merely required the Artists to construct their artwork primarily in the lobby of
the building. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 317. Testimony at trial supported the
conclusion that the Artists were hired to design the lobby. See id. The record
showed, however, that the Artists did perform projects outside of the lobby area,
including the sixth floor, eighth floor and boiler room. See Carter l, 71 F.3d at 86.
102. See CarterII, 71 F.3d at 87. The Artists agreed under written contract to
work on a forty hour a week basis and to only do other work that would not inter-
fere with the services they provided to the defendants. See id. The Artists proved,
however, at a preliminary injunction hearing, that they had unrestricted twenty-
four hour access to the building and often worked far in excess of this minimum
work requirement under the contract. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 320. Further-
more, the Artists proved that they received the same payments even when their
hours fluctuated. See id.
The defendants also paid the Artists a weekly salary of $1000 per week. See
Carter I, 71 F.3d at 86. SIG and the Limited Partnership also provided the Artists
with employee benefits, such as life and health insurance. See id. at 86-87. The
Artists received such benefits through December 31, 1993, and thereafter contin-
ued to work without benefits. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 318-19. Furthermore, the
defendants paid payroll and social security taxes on the Artists' behalf. See CarterlI,
71 F.3d at 86. In 1991, 1992 and 1993 the Artists received W-2 forms from either
SIG or the Limited Partnership. See Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 319.
103. See CarterII, 71 F.3d at 80. The contract stated that the Artists were enti-
tled to "receive design credit" for their art and to own the copyright. See Carter I,
861 F. Supp. at 312.
104. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80. The artwork in the lobby included a large
mosaic covering the majority of the lobby and portions of the walls. See Carter I,
861 F. Supp. at 314. This work included artwork that was installed in three eleva-
tors that opened into the lobby. See id.
105. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80. The work included a vast mosaic made of
recycled glass that was embedded in the floors and walls. See id. The Artists cre-
ated a giant hand from an old school bus and a face made from automobile parts.
See id. Most of the materials used in the sculpture were recycled materials. See
Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 315. Although some elements were made from new mater-
ials, they had the appearance of recycled materials. See id. at 80 n.7.
106. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80. A statement in the floor mosaic, "DO YOU
REMEMBER WATER," flows from a depiction of a giant mouth surrounding an
elevator. See Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 315. This type of depiction was intended to
show the negative effects of failure to recycle. See id. Various sculptural elements
hung from the ceiling to represent "space junk." See id. This showed the danger of
dumping refuse in space. See id. The individual pieces related to each other in this
way to create an overall meaning. See id.
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On March 31, 1994, upon termination of the Limited Partner-
ship's lease, Associates regained possession of the property. 10 7
Thereafter, Helmsley-Spear, Inc. assumed the management of the
property.108 Helmsley-Spear's representatives forbade the Artists
from installing any further artwork, and indicated that they in-
tended to remove the completed art from the building. 10 9 The Art-
ists believed that this was a mutilation of their artwork under VARA
and filed this claim to enjoin the defendants from taking such ac-
tions. 110 The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the Artists an injunction under VARA prohibiting the re-
moval of their work from the building.1"' The Associates appealed
to the Second Circuit. 112
107. See CarterfI, 71 F.3d at 80. The Limited Partnership filed for bankruptcy
one week after the termination of its lease. See id. at 81. Associates took control of
the property on April 6, 1994. See id.
108. See id. at 81.
109. See id. On April 7, 1994, Helmsley-Spear's agents ordered the Artists to
vacate the property and told them they would be trespassing if they returned. See
Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 313. The Artists believed, after the defendants made cer-
tain statements, that the defendants would dismantle their artwork. See id.
110. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 310. The Artists sought to prevent the altera-
tion or destruction of their artwork and to recover money damages, costs and at-
torney's fees. See id. at 310-11. Plaintiffs' first claim was for relief under VARA,
however, their amended complaint also alleged willful infringement of copyright,
tortious interference with contract, and unlawful ejection. See id. at 311. The de-
fendants entered a counterclaim for waste, alleging that the sculpture resulted in
violations of the Fire Code of the City of New York, and therefore diminished the
market value of the property. See id.
On April 21, 1994, the Artists sought a temporary restraining order to prevent
defendants from altering or destroying their artwork. See id. On April 26, 1994,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York issued the temporary re-
straining order enjoining defendants from (1) altering or destroying the artwork;
and (2) denying the Artists access to the building. See id.
On May 5, 1994, the district court commenced a hearing on the Artists' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from: (1) altering,
modifying, or mutilating the artwork; (2) taking action to breach agreements with
the Artists; and (3) denying the Artists access to the building. See id. On May 18,
1994, the district court granted in part and denied in part the Artists' motion for a
preliminary injunction. See id. The court ordered that, while the action was pend-
ing, the defendants were enjoined from: (1) altering, modifying, or mutilating the
artwork; and (2) denying the Artists access to the building. See id.
111. See id. at 337. At a bench trial held in June and July of 1994, the district
court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from distorting, mu-
tilating, modifying, destroying and removing plaintiffs' artwork. See id. The dis-
trict court dismissed the Artists' other claims, including tortious interference with
contract, unlawful ejectment, and costs and attorney's fees, as well as the defend-
ants' counterclaim for waste. See id.
112. See id. The defendants appealed the district court's dismissal of their
counterclaim. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 79. The Artists cross-appealed from the dis-
missal of their cause of action for tortious interference, for attorney's fees, and
from the denial of their requests to complete the work. See id. at 80.
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III. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,113 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit considered whether VARA protected certain sculp-
ture work, incorporated in a New York building, from distortion,
mutilation, or other modifications. 114 The Artists of the sculpture
contended that any alteration or destruction of their work violated
their moral rights under VARA. 1 15 The court of appeals addressed
three issues in its analysis: (1) whether the sculpture, which con-
sisted of various pieces, was a single work or multiple works; (2)
whether the sculpture constituted a "work of visual art" within the
statutory definition; and (3) whether the "work made for hire" ex-
ception under VARA precluded the Artists from protection.1 16
A. Singleness of the Work
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals commenced its analysis
by considering whether the sculpture was a single piece of art
under VARA. 117 The parties agreed, under a joint stipulation, that
"the Work" included a long list of sculptural elements.' 1 8 Although
the district court concluded that the sculpture was a single work,"19
it held that a few of the listed elements in the parties' joint stipula-
113. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
114. See id. at 79. Because VARA is a relatively new statute, the Carter case
raised a number of issues of first impression. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 310. The
Second Circuit, the first and only circuit court to analyze VARA, followed the defi-
nition section of the Act to reach its conclusion. See CarterII, 71 F.3d at 83. See also
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). For the relevant text of the definition section, see supra
notes 59 & 64.
115. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 81.
116. Id. at 83-88.
117. See id. at 83. The court needed to determine whether it would analyze
the artwork as a single piece or analyze each individual element in the work sepa-
rately. See id.
118. See id. at 83-84. The parties entered into this joint stipulation for the
purpose of framing the issues at trial. See id.
119. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 315. The district court based its finding on
three things: (1) the testimony of the parties and expert witnesses; (2) the method
of creation; and (3) the court's own inspection of the sculpture. See id. at 314-15.
It was clear that the Artists considered the work in the lobby to be one piece of
artwork. See id. at 314. The Artists testified that "[i]t would be like removing part
of a painting or the hands from a portrait because we consider this to be one
work." Id. (quoting testimony of plaintiff John Carter). The court also heard the
expert testimony of Professor Aedwyn Darroll, an art teacher at the Parson School
of Design in New York City. See id. Mr. Darroll testified that the elements of the
sculpture were interrelated. See id.
The district court also looked to the method of creation. See id. Each sculp-
tural element of the work related to the previously created element. See id. For
example, a vast mosaic, attached to the floor and walls, is interrelated with various
sculptural elements attached to the floor, walls and ceiling. See id. at 315.
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tion were not part of "the Work."1 20 The Associates argued that the
district court could not find some elements to be individual works,
while also holding that "the Work" was a single one. 121
The court of appeals rejected the Associates' argument, noting
that it was based on the mistaken belief that the parties' joint stipu-
lation precluded a fact-finder from determining that most but not
all elements made up a single work.122 The court stated that the
"[district] court was free to find that a few items of 'the Work' were
separate works of art, while the remainder of 'the Work' was a sin-
gle, interrelated, indivisible work of art."123 The court of appeals
recognized that it could only overturn such factual findings if they
were clearly erroneous.1 24 Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed that the sculpture constituted a single work of art
under VARA.125
B. The Statutory Definition of "Work of Visual Art"
Having determined that the sculpture work was a single work
of art, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals then analyzed whether
it satisfied the definition of "work of visual art" under VARA.126
The court noted that "work of visual art" is defined in terms both
positive (what it is) and negative (what it is not).127 VARA defines a
"work of visual art" as "a painting, drawing, or sculpture existing in
At the request of the parties, the court inspected the Artists' sculpture on July
14, 1994. See id. The court concluded, upon inspection and testimony at trial, that
the work was a single work of art. See id.
120. See id. The district court concluded that certain items listed in the joint
Pretrial Order, under the definition of "the Work," were not actually part of the
work. See id. These items included a building directory, the entrance steps, and
certain ceiling and wall lighting. See id.
121. See Carter I, 71 F.3d at 84. According to the Associates, the single work
of art must include every stipulated element in the definition. See id. The Associ-
ates' goal was to apply VARA to each individual element separately because several
elements would not be visual art when standing alone. See id. The district court
noted that the sculpture, however, was much greater than the sum of its parts. See
id.
122. See id. at 84.
123. See id. The Second Circuit noted that the district court's finding was
based on the credibility of witnesses and the court's own inspection of the artwork.
See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 84. VARA only protects works that fit within the
definition of "work of visual art." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). For the relevant text of
VARA, see supra notes 59-64.
127. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 84. A work of art must satisfy the positive defini-
tion of "work of visual art" and also survive the exclusions under the Act. See id.
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a single copy" or in a limited edition of 200 or fewer copies) 28
VARA, however, excludes from the definition "any poster, map,
globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work."129 The court concluded
that a sculpture that exists in a single copy necessarily fulfills the
positive branch of the definition.130
Under the negative branch of the definition, works of visual art
do not include works of "applied art."131 "Applied art" describes
"two-and-three-dimensional ornamentation or decoration that is af-
fixed to otherwise utilitarian objects."13 2 The Associates argued
that VARA did not cover the sculpture work because the work in-
corporated elements of applied art, such as sculptures attached to
the floor and ceiling.' 33 The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment, stating that "nothing in VARA proscribes protection of works
of visual art that incorporate elements of, rather than constitute,
applied art."13 4 Thus, the court concluded that the sculpture fit
within the positive definition of "work of visual art" and did not
qualify as "applied art."1 35
128. 17 U.S.C. § 101. For the relevant text of VARA, see supra note 59.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 101. For the relevant text of VARA, see supra note 60.
130. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 84. The Associates argued that individual ele-
ments of the sculpture were not visual art. See id. The court stated that this con-
tention was foreclosed by the court's finding that the sculpture was a single work of
art. See id. The court noted that once a sculpture is accepted as a single piece of
art and it exists in only one copy, it specifically falls within the positive definition of
"work of visual art." See id.
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). For the relevant text of VARA, see supra note
59.
132. Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 315 (citing Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir. 1980)). In Kieselstein, a copyright case, the
Second Circuit held that certain artistic belt buckles could be copyrighted even
though they were incorporated into useful articles. Kieselstein, 632 F.2d at 993-94.
Nothing in the copyright statute prohibits copyright registration because of an arti-
cle's intended use. See id. at 996 (Weinstein J., dissenting) (citing Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954)).
133. See Carter 11, 71 F.3d at 85. The Associates argued that some of the indi-
vidual elements of the sculpture were affixed to the floor, walls and ceiling. See id.
The court concluded that the Associates' reading of the statute would prevent the
protection of all works of art incorporated in buildings. See id. VARA specifically
protects certain works of visual art that are incorporated in buildings. See id. The
Associates' reading would render this protection under VARA meaningless. See id.
134. See id. The Second Circuit pointed to VARA's legislative history that
states, "a new and independent work created from snippets of [excluded] materi-
als, such as a collage, is of course not excluded" from the definition of a work of
visual art. Id. (quoting H.R. REp. No. 101-514, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917). The district court noted that certain items, such as the
building directory, the entrance steps, and certain lighting, were "applied art or
strictly utilitarian objects," and therefore were not protected under VARA. See
Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 316.
135. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 85.
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C. Works Made For Hire
The court of appeals next analyzed whether VARA's "work
made for hire" exception precluded moral rights protection. 13 6
The Associates maintained that the Artists were "employees" acting
within the scope of employment and therefore the sculpture was
not a work of visual art under VARA. 137 The court applied the Reid
test to determine whether the sculpture was excluded from VARA
protection under the "work made for hire" exception. 13 8
The court of appeals began its analysis by applying the five spe-
cific Reid factors set forth in Aymes v. Bonelli: (1) the right to control
the manner and means of production; (2) the requisite skill; (3)
whether the hired party may be assigned additional projects; (4)
the provision of employee benefits; and (5) the tax treatment of the
hired party.139 First, the court considered who had the right to con-
trol the manner and means of production.1 40 The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's finding that both the contract lan-
guage14 1 and the parties' actions 142 showed that the Artists con-
136. See id. at 85-88. Under VARA, a work of visual art does not include a
.work made for hire." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). For the relevant text of VARA,
see supra note 64.
137. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 85. Under the copyright laws, the definition of
"work made for hire" is divided into two parts: (1) employees acting within the
scope of their employment; and (2) certain specified independent contractors. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). The parties agreed that the second part of the definition
did not apply in the Carter case. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 316. For the relevant
text of VARA, see supra note 64.
138. See Carter I, 71 F.3d at 85. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
the Supreme Court set forth thirteen factors to determine whether a person is an
employee under the definition of "work made for hire." Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989). For a full discussion of Reid, see supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
139. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86. In Aymes v. Bonelli, the Second Circuit estab-
lished five Reid factors that are relevant in nearly all work made for hire cases.
Aymes, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992). For a full discussion of Aymes, see supra
notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
140. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86.
141. See id. The district court determined that the contract language sug-
gested that the Artists had the right to control the manner and means of creation.
See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 317. Under the contract, the Artists had "full authority
in design, color, and style." Id. The hiring party had the right only to direct the
location of the work within the property. See id.
142. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80. The district court determined that the parties'
actions indicated that the Artists controlled the manner and means of production.
See Carter , 861 F. Supp. at 317. In the district court, Theodore Nearing, who
assumed property management from Mr. Cohen of SIG, testified that neither he
nor SIG had any input with respect to design or placement of sculptures in the
lobby. See id. The Artists also testified that they decided the design of the artwork.
See id. Mr. Cohen, the property manager under SIG Management Company, testi-
fied that he dictated what he wanted the Artists to create. See id. The district
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trolled the manner and means of production.1 43  The court of
appeals noted, however, that the hiring party's control is not a de-
terminative factor under the Reid test.144
Second, the court examined the skill required to create the
sculpture. 45 The Associates argued that the Artists' use of assist-
ants mitigated the skill required. 146 The court disagreed and con-
cluded that the use of assistants did not diminish the great level of
skill required to create the sculpture. 147 The court noted that each
plaintiff was a professional sculptor, a highly skilled occupation. 148
Third, the court of appeals analyzed whether the Associates
could assign additional projects to the Artists.149 The court looked
to the contract that required the Artists not only to create the sculp-
ture, but also to "render such other related services and duties as
may be assigned to [them] from time to time by the Company.' 150
court, however, found Mr. Cohen's testimony to be contradictory at times, and
generally not credible. See id.
The Associates argued that the building's managers, architects and others sug-
gested alterations of the work. See id. at 318. Although the record indicated that
the management companies and the building's tenants made several suggestions,
and the Artists occasionally adopted some of these suggestions, the district court
found that the Artists retained full discretion in creation. See id. at 317-18.
143. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86. The Second Circuit agreed that the Artists'
control over the sculpture indicated independent contractor status. See id.
144. See id. at 86. "While artistic freedom remains a central factor in our in-
quiry, the Supreme Court has cautioned that 'the extent of control the hiring
party exercises over the details of the product is not dispositive.'" Id. (quoting
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989)).
145. See Carter I, 71 F.3d at 86.
146. See id. Specifically, the Associates argued that the Artists delegated cer-
tain tile work to others, therefore the creation of the mosaic did not require great
skill. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 318. The district court disagreed, holding that
the entire process of creating the sculpture required great skill. See id. The Artists
designed, created, and constructed the entire project. See id. The district court
stated "[t]he use of paid and unpaid assistants working at plaintiffs' behest and
under their direct supervision does not in any way demonstrate that plaintiffs did
not require skill to create the Work." Id.
147. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86. The circuit court, therefore, upheld the dis-
trict court's finding that the sculpture required a great level of skill. See id.
148. See id. at 86. Both parties agreed that professional sculpting is a highly
skilled profession. See id. The district court noted that numerous courts have simi-
larly held that artists and sculptors are highly skilled creators. See Carter I, 861 F.
Supp. at 318 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 752 (1989)).
149. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86. The district court noted that when a hired
party is hired to perform various unspecified chores, the hired party is likely to be
an employee. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 319. Conversely, when a hired party is
hired for a specific task, the hired party is an independent contractor. See id.
"[I]ndependent contractors are typically hired only for particular projects." Id.
(quoting Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863).
150. Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86. The Second Circuit reasoned that by the very
terms of the contract, the Associates had the right to assign additional projects to
the Artists. See id.
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The court reasoned that the Associates could assign work other
than the principal sculpture, regardless of whether this additional
work was art related or not.151 The court of appeals, therefore, de-
termined that this right to assign additional projects indicated an
employee relationship. 152
Next, the court of appeals considered the fourth and fifth Reid
factors, namely, the provision of employee benefits and the tax
treatment of the Artists. 153 The Associates provided the Artists with
certain benefits, including life, health, and liability insurance. 154
The Associates also paid payroll and social security taxes on the
151. See id. The court of appeals noted that the defendants could assign
projects in addition to "the Sculpture." See id. "[T]he performance of other as-
signed work not of the artists' choosing supports a conclusion that the Artists were
not independent contractors but employees." Id. Furthermore, the court of ap-
peals noted that the Associates did in fact assign additional projects. See id. The
Associates assigned projects to the Artists on the sixth floor, the eighth floor, and
the boiler room. See id. The Artists completed these additional projects without
further compensation. See id.
The district court conversely found that the Associates could not assign addi-
tional projects other than artwork. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 319. The Associates
argued that the Artists created artwork in areas other than the lobby, and there-
fore the Artists were assigned additional projects as the contract describes. See id.
The district court concentrated on the fact that the Associates hired the Artists
solely to create artwork at the property. See id. The district court also noted that
neither party viewed the Artists as employees required to complete additional
projects. See id. Testimony at trial showed that the Artists refused to do chores in
other buildings when the Associates requested them to do so. See id. Nonetheless,
the Associates did not penalize the Artists in any way for these refusals. See id.
Furthermore, the district court found that one of the Artists, a licensed structural
steel welder, was not required to do any welding work at the property. See id.
152. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86.
153. See id. at 86-87.
154. See id. at 86. The Associates provided life, health, and liability insurance,
as well as paid vacations to the Artists. See id. The Associates also contributed to
unemployment insurance and workers compensation for the Artists. See id. at 86-
87. In addition, the Artists filed for unemployment benefits after their termina-
tion, and the Artists listed the building's management company as their former
employer. See id. at 87. The Artists agreed to work principally for the defendants
for forty hours per week. See id. Furthermore, the Associates paid the Artists on a
weekly basis at $1000 per week. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 320.
The district court recognized that the defendants provided health and insur-
ance benefits only through December 31, 1993. See id. at 318. The Artists contin-
ued to work after this point without any benefits. See id. at 319. The district court
also found that the forty hours per week work requirement was meaningless. See
id. at 320. The Artists showed that they had twenty-four hour access to the building
and worked more or less than forty hours without any increase or decrease in pay.
See id.
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plaintiffs' behalf.155 The court of appeals, therefore, noted that
these factors were also indicative of an employee relationship. 156
Finally, the court listed other Reid factors that indicated an em-
ployment relationship. 157 These factors included: the provision of
supplies' 58; the length of the relationshipl 59 ; and the need for the
Associates' approval when hiring assistants.160 Additionally, the
court refused to address whether the Artists' copyright ownership
of the sculpture affected the Reid test.' 61 Weighing all the above
factors, the court of appeals concluded that the sculpture was a
155. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 86. In 1991, 1992 and 1993, either SIG Manage-
ment Company or the Limited Partnership provided the Artists with W-2 forms
and withheld taxes from them during this period. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 319.
156. See Carter I, 71 F.3d at 87. In concluding that the fourth and fifth Reid
factors weighed in favor of an employment relationship, the Second Circuit up-
held the district court's findings on these elements. See id. The district court
noted, however, that the provision of benefits and the tax treatment of the Artists,
like the other Reid factors, is not determinative of an employee relationship. See
Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 319. The district court stressed this, especially in light of
the fact that the Artists continued to work after such benefits and tax payments
ceased. See id.
157. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 87-88.
158. See id. at 87. The Second Circuit found that the Artists were provided
with almost all of the supplies used to create the sculpture. See id. The court dis-
agreed with the district court's finding that this factor was inconclusive. See id.
The district court treated this factor as inconclusive because the evidence showed
that both the Artists and the Associates provided instrumentalities used to create
the work. See Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 319-20. SIG and the Limited Partnership
provided certain tools and raw materials, however, the Artists also used their own
tools and thousands of dollars worth of their own materials. See id. The district
court noted that the Artists were not reimbursed for their material costs. See id.
The court of appeals overruled this determination and found that the defendants
provided many (if not all) of the supplies. See Carter 1I, 71 F.3d at 87.
159. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 87. The Second Circuit held that the Artists
worked for over two years with no set termination date other than upon comple-
tion of the sculpture. See id. The court considered this to be a substantial amount
of time. See id. The Second Circuit, therefore overruled the district court's finding
that the Associates hired the Artists for a "finite term of engagement." See id. The
district court concentrated on the fact that the Associates hired the Artists for the
duration of a single project, the installation of artwork. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at
320. The district court noted that the Associates did not employ the Artists prior
to the sculpture project and also failed to show that they would retain the Artists
after the sculpture project was complete. See id.
160. See CarterfI, 71 F.3d at 87. The Circuit Court found that the requirement
that the Artists obtain approval from SIG of the Limited Partnership for the hiring
of assistants was characteristic of an employee relationship. See id. The court dis-
agreed with the district court's finding that this factor was inconclusive. See id.
The district court also held that this requirement was characteristic of an employee
relationship. See id. The district court, however, found that the Artists' discretion
of what assistants to hire and when, was characteristic of an independent contrac-
tor. See id. The district court, therefore, found this factor to be inconclusive. See
id.
161. See Carter I, 71 F.3d at 87. The court ruled that even if copyright owner-
ship was a "plus factor," as the district court held, it would not change the Second
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work made for hire and therefore was not protected under
VARA. 162 This determination is questionable, as the next section of
this Note illustrates.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYsIs
In Carter, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's deter-
mination that the sculpture was a work made for hire, and thus not
protected under VARA, was incorrect for three reasons. First, the
court, in its methodical application of the Reid test, failed to recog-
nize that the work made for hire exception under VARA drastically
differs from the traditional work made for hire analysis in the copy-
right ownership context. Second, the court's analysis of VARA's
work made for hire exception is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Reid. Finally, the court did not need to apply
the Reid test, a test developed to determine copyright ownership,
because the Artists already owned the copyright to the sculpture.
The court of appeals ignored the differences between the work
made for hire exception under VARA and the traditional work
made for hire analysis under copyright law. Although VARA shares
the same textual definition of "work made for hire" as does tradi-
Circuit's analysis. See id. The court, therefore, declined to decide the effect of
copyright ownership on the Reid test. See id.
In contrast, the district court determined that the purpose of the "work made
for hire" exception under VARA is different than under normal copyright analysis.
See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 321. The Reid test is usually applied to determine
copyright ownership. See id. Conversely, under VARA's "work made for hire" ex-
ception, courts must determine whether a work is a "work of visual art." See id.
The district court stated:
Under VARA, however, the 'work made for hire' analysis is undertaken
for a different purpose: the hired party's employment status is analyzed to
ascertain whether a work created by that party may be considered a 'work
of visual art.' As such, it is logical to consider copyright ownership when
the 'work made for hire' analysis is necessary in an action seeking protec-
tion of a work of art under VARA. Among other things, this analysis, if
helpful in a given case, can assist the Court in ascertaining how the inter-
ested parties viewed their own relationship.
Id. at 321-22.
162. See Carter II, 71 F.3d at 88. The court listed factors that did not influence
its decision. See id. at 87-88. These factors included: the terms "employee" and
"employment" in the contract, the fact that the Artists did the work on the em-
ployer's property, and boilerplate contract language that deducted FICA taxes. See
id. at 87.
The Second Circuit did not need to address VARA's protection of art that is
incorporated into buildings. See id. at 88. Similarly, the court did not need to
address the Associates' Fifth Amendment takings argument. See id. The court also
did not address the Artists' contentions that they were entitled to finish their work,
collect attorney's fees and collect damages for tortious interference of contract.
See id. The court also upheld the district court's dismissal of the Associates' coun-
terclaim for waste. See id.
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tional copyright law, this is only the beginning of the analysis. 163
When analyzing the work made for hire exception of VARA, courts
should recognize that moral rights are "distinct from the normal
incidents of copyright ownership. 1 6 4 The underlying intent of
VARA and its work made for hire exception clarify this
distinction. 165
In enacting VARA, Congress intended to preserve original
works of art.166 Admittedly, Congress went to extreme lengths to
limit the works of art covered as a result of intense opposition by
the publication and production industries. 1 67 VARA, however,
strikes a balance between the competing interests of artists and
publication industries by protecting only original works of art and
not reproductions. 168 The legislative history of VARA explicitly rec-
ognizes the value of original works of art.' 69 Furthermore, the legis-
lative history indicates that the protection of physical objects of art,
as opposed to reproductions, does not disrupt producers and pub-
lishers.170 In Carter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals failed to
grant VARA protection to an original work of art. Under the
court's ruling, the sole version of an artist's work can be displayed
in a mutilated and altered form and yet still the artist is left with no
163. For the definition of work made for hire, see supra note 64.
164. Nimmer, supra note 13, § 8D.06[A] [1], at 8D-67 n.45. Although the
copyright doctrine is "inextricably implicated" in VARA analysis, moral rights are
analyzed separately from normal copyright ownership analysis. See id.
165. For a discussion of the underlying intent of both VARA and VARA's work
made for hire exception, see supra notes 46-94 and accompanying text.
166. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8-10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6917-20. VARA protects works of art that are originals or limited editions
because these works are generally not transformed to suit different markets. See id.
For a discussion of VARA's intent to protect original works of art, see supra notes
47-49 and accompanying text.
167. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 10-11. The legislative history to VARA spe-
cifically states that Congress went to extreme lengths to narrowly define "work of
visual art" so not to infringe on the reproduction rights of publication and produc-
tion industries. See id. For the relevant legislative history, see supra notes 47-95 and
accompanying text.
168. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 11-12. The legislative history suggests that
the Act is intended to protect original copies and limited editions, as opposed to
mass production works, such as those works of the publishing and production in-
dustries. See id.
169. See id. "The bill recognizes the special value inherent in the original or
limited edition copy of a work of art. The original or few copies with which the
artist was most in contact embody the artist's 'personality' far more closely than
subsequent mass produced images." Id. at 12.
170. See id. at 10. VARA's limited scope assures both the protection of origi-
nal works of visual art and the protection of the publication and production indus-
tries. See id.
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remedy under VARA.171 This result is contrary to VARA's principal
goal as a preservation statute. 172
The underlying intent of VARA's work made for hire excep-
tion itself further discredits the strict application of the Reid test in
the VARA context. Congress excluded works made for hire from
VARA protection to "reinforce the premise of the bill" to protect
original works of art rather than works of mass publication. 173 The
court of appeals failed to recognize the intent of the work made for
hire exception and blindly applied the Reid test, which the Supreme
Court developed as a method of determining copyright owner-
ship.174 An artist that claims VARA protection, however, does not
seek copyright ownership. The Reid test, therefore, should not ap-
ply to the work made for hire exception under VARA. The district
court in Carter recognized that the work made for hire analysis
under VARA is undertaken to determine whether a work is consid-
ered a "work of visual art," and not to determine copyright owner-
ship.175 Under VARA's work made for hire exception, Congress
intended to protect singular works of visual art and at the same
time protect the distribution rights of publishers and producers.1 76
In Carter, however, the competing publication interests of copyright
owners were not an issue because the sculpture was a single work, as
opposed to a work of mass production. 177 The court of appeals,
therefore, blindly applied the Reid test to the work made for hire
171. See Carter I, 71 F.3d at 88. The Carter court held that the sculpture was
not a "work of visual art," and therefore the Artists had no rights to impede the
building owners from handling the work as they wished. Id.
172. For a discussion of VARA's principal goals as a preservation statute, see
supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
173. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 13.
174. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
All subsequent cases applying the Reid test have done so to determine copyright
ownership. For a list of the cases applying the Reid test to determine copyright
ownership, see supra note 80. For a full discussion of the Reid test, see supra notes
70-79 and accompanying text.
175. See Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 322-23. The district court noticed the differ-
ent purpose of the work made for hire exception under VARA, as opposed to
when applied to determine copyright ownership. See id. at 322. "Under VARA,
however, the 'work made for hire' analysis is undertaken for a different purpose:
The hired party's employment status is analyzed to ascertain whether a work cre-
ated by that party may be considered a 'work of visual art.'" Id.
176. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 10. "Because of its limited nature, [VARA]
protects the legitimate interests of visual artists without inhibiting the rights of
copyright owners and users, and without undue interference with the successful
operation of the American copyright system." Id.
177. See CarterII, 71 F.3d at 84. The court held that the sculpture in Carter was
classified as a single work, rather than separate works, under VARA. Id. at 83-85.
The sculpture at issue was the original artwork, not a copy resulting from a mass
publication. See id.
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exception under VARA and ignored Congress' intent to protect
original works of art.
Furthermore, the Carter court's rigid application of the Reid
test in the VARA context is directly at odds with the language of
Reid. The Supreme Court explicitly set forth the Reid test as a deli-
cate balance between a creator's copyright ownership interests and
the hiring party's right of distribution. 178 These same competing
interests, however, are not at play in the work made for hire excep-
tion under VARA. Instead, it is an artist's moral rights, and not the
right of ownership, that compete with the hiring party's interests in
distribution. 179 The court of appeals failed to recognize that the
delicate balance set forth in Reid is skewed under VARA because the
artist does not seek copyright ownership, but instead seeks less in-
trusive rights, namely his or her moral rights. 180
Finally, the court in Carter, did not need to apply the Reid test
because the Artists owned the copyright to their work under a writ-
ten agreement. 181 The court of appeals conceded that it was uncer-
tain whether copyright ownership affects the Reid analysis. 182 It is
illogical, however, to conclude that copyright ownership does not
affect the Reid test, a test specifically designed to determine copy-
178. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748
(1989). The Supreme Court in Reid analyzed the "work made for hire" definition
as a "carefully worked out compromise" between the copyright interests of creators
and copyright-using industries. Id. at 748. For a discussion of the balance of inter-
ests set forth in the Reid test, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of the competing interests that are balanced under
VARA, see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
180. VARA was the result of over ten years of negotiation between creators
and copyright-using industries. See Parry, supra note 15, at 1018 n.1. On one
hand, artists sought protection of their reputation and the integrity of their works,
and on the other, the publication and production industries wished "to maintain
their rights of editing and reproduction." SENATE HEARINcs, supra note 57, at 24-
25 (statement by Representative Markey). As a compromise, VARA protects only a
select group of artists that create physical works of art, as opposed to works incor-
porated in publications or productions. See id "Unlike works of literary or per-
forming artists, artworks created by visual artists are treated more as physical
objects than as expressions of the artistic creativity of their authors." Id. For a
discussion of the competing interests at issue under VARA, see supra notes 60-63
and accompanying text.
181. Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80.
182. See id. at 87. The court stated:
In reaching its conclusion, the district court also relied partly on the art-
ists' copyright ownership of the sculpture, viewing such ownership as a
'plus factor.' We are not certain whether this element is a 'plus factor,'
and therefore put off for another day deciding whether copyright owner-
ship is probative of independent contractor status. Even were it to be
weighed as a 'plus factor,' it would not change the outcome in this case.
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right ownership.1 83 This anomaly is the result of the inherent dif-
ferences between the work made for hire exception under VARA
and the traditional work made for hire analysis in the copyright
ownership context.
In summary, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals failed to rec-
ognize the differences between VARA's work made for hire excep-
tion and the traditional work made for hire analysis under
copyright law. The court blindly applied the Reid test and did not
consider Congress' intent to protect original works of visual art as
opposed to works used in reproductions and publications. As a re-
sult, the court of appeals failed to protect the only version of a work
of visual art.
V. IMPACT
The Carter holding effectively eliminates moral rights protec-
tion for many artists. The Supreme Court established the Reid test
to insure predictability of copyright ownership through advance
planning.1 8 4 The Second Circuit's holding will also enable hiring
parties to stifle a creator's moral rights through such advance plan-
ning. Artists, who typically have little bargaining strength, will be
forced to waive their moral rights. 8 5 Even when artists are not
forced to waive their moral rights, they will have to choose between
personal benefits that come from an employee relationship, and
protection of their works under VARA.186
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's holding will encourage art-
ists to seek relief under alternative theories. In enacting VARA,
183. See Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 321-22.
184. Reid, 490 U.S. at 750. For a discussion of the Reid Court's attempt to
ensure predictability of copyright ownership, see supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
185. One commentator noted that artists can take several precautions to en-
sure that their creations will not qualify as "work made for hire." See Goodin, supra
note 15, at 579. The artist should not allow the property owner to assert too much
control over the work. See id. The artist should also work in his or her own studio,
collect payment at the end of the project, and contract separately for different
works. See id, The artist should not sign any contract that specifies that the work is
a "work made for hire." See id.
During the drafting of the 1976 Copyright Act, artists noted that they did not
have the bargaining power to reject contracts that label their work as "work made
for hire." See Reid, 490 U.S. at 745-46. With this concern in mind, Congress re-jected a previously proposed bill that would have allowed property owners to label
all commissioned works as "work made for hire" so long as they had written con-
sent. See id
186. See Carter A, 71 F.3d at 87. The Second Circuit, in Carter, conceded that
counting certain benefits against an artist's independent contractor status forces
artists to choose between these benefits and VARA protection. Id.
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VisuAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT
Congress intended to provide a single set of unified moral rights to
replace the "patchwork" of state laws protecting artists. 18 7 The Sec-
ond Circuit's holding will force artists to revert to other legal theo-
ries to redress damages to their reputation. 188
The Second Circuit is the only court of appeals to address the
work made for hire exception under VARA. It is therefore difficult
to predict whether its analysis will persuade other jurisdictions.
New York, however, is home to a great number of artists and it is
clear that these artists will receive little moral rights protection
under VARA.18 9 In analyzing the work made for hire exception
under VARA, subsequent courts should instead effectuate Con-
gress' intent to preserve the integrity of our artworks.1 90
Jamesj. Mastroianni
187. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 9-10. For a discussion of Congress' intent
to provide a unified protection of Artists' moral rights, see supra note 50 and ac-
companying text.
188. One commentator noted that if an employer portrays a work of visual art
solely under the employer's name without any credit to the actual creator, the
creator may still bring a claim for false description or designation of origin. See
Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 482 n.28. Furthermore, if an employer distorts an art-
ist's creation, the artist may have a similar claim of false designation of origin. See
id. at 482.
189. The New York legislature, encouraged by the vocal New York art commu-
nity, was the second state to enact state moral rights legislation. See Lerner & Bres-
ler, supra note 12, at 428-31.
190. For a discussion of Congress' intent under VARA, see supra notes 46-50
and accompanying text.
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